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Uncertainty in Weighting Formulary Apportionment Factors  
and its Impact on After-Tax Income of Multinational Groups	
Regina Ortmann*	
Abstract	
Formulary apportionment is an intensively debated mechanism for allocating tax base within 
multinational groups. Systems under which the formula is identical in all jurisdictions and systems 
under which jurisdictions can determine the weights on the formula factors individually can be 
observed. The latter systems produce uncertainty about the overall tax-liable share of the future group 
tax base. Counter-intuitively, I identify scenarios under which increased uncertainty leads to higher 
expected future group income. My results provide helpful insights for firms and policy makers 
debating the specific design of a formulary apportionment system. 
 
Keywords: CCCTB, factor weights, formulary apportionment, tax uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to thank Caren Sureth, Eva Eberhartinger, Erich Pummerer, Thomas Hoppe, the participants of the Research 
Interaction Forum of the 2014 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting in Atlanta, the participants of the 2014 
European Accounting Association Annual Meeting in Tallinn, the participants of the 2014 Doctoral Seminar in Taxation at 
Vienna University of Economics and Business and the members of the DIBT Doctoral Program in International Business 
Taxation at Vienna University of Economics and Business for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors or inaccuracies 
are, of course, my own. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF grant W 1235-G16) is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
*DIBT Doctoral Program in International Business Taxation at Vienna University of Economics and Business, 
Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria, and University of Paderborn, Department for Taxation, Accounting, and Finance, 
Chair of Business Administration, especially Business Taxation, Warburger Straße 100, 33098 Paderborn, Germany, email: 
regina.ortmann@uni-paderborn.de.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2521386 
2 
 
1 Introduction	
The allocation of the corporate tax base between entities of multijurisdictional groups (MJGs) is 
gaining importance in a globalized world. Current statistics confirm that companies operate more and 
more internationally. According to the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 2013, the 
global FDI inward and outward positions increased strongly over the last decades. Moreover, as 
forecasted by the World Investment Report 2013 of the UNCTAD, global foreign direct investment is 
expected to further increase over the next years (cf. UNCTAD, 2013, p. 18).1  
Jurisdictions increasingly have to deal with how and especially where to tax the profits from such 
multijurisdictional activities. When it comes to taxation, the coordination between jurisdictions is very 
difficult. Allocating tax revenues via double tax treaties results frequently in over- or undertaxation of 
MJGs. An alternative method is a common tax system between the jurisdictions that is based on 
formulary apportionment. Unexpected at first sight, depending on the degree of coordination in the 
allocation process, formulary apportionment may also cause cases of over- or undertaxation, which 
need to be investigated in detail.  
Under formulary apportionment the overall tax base of a MJG is allocated to each group entity by 
using a formula that is supposed to determine the share of economic activity of each entity. This 
approach is already used on the subnational level in several countries; e.g. the US, Canada, 
Switzerland and Germany.2 Formulary apportionment is a hot topic that is currently being discussed 
by the OECD with reference to the tax base allocation of MJGs on a global level (cf. Center for Tax 
Policy and Administration, OECD, 2010, pp. 8-9), as well as by the European Commission (EC) in 
connection with the implementation of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
between EU Member States.  
                                                            
1  The internationalization of transnational companies grew in 2012, with foreign affiliates’ value added and 
exports rising moderately, cf. UNCTAD 2013, p. 23, Kelly 2001, p. 539. 
2  In Canada, Switzerland and the US, formulary apportionment is used to allocate the corporate income tax. In 
Canada, it is applied on the level of the provinces, in Switzerland on the level of the cantons and in the US on 
the state level. In Germany, formulary apportionment is used to allocate the local business tax between the 
municipalities. 
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In March 2011, the EC submitted a proposal for a Council Directive on a CCCTB (cf. European 
Commission, 2011). Under the proposed system, the apportionment formula will consist of the three 
equally weighted factors of assets, labor and sales. However, whether this proposed system will come 
into force is far from clear. The Member States face enormous difficulties in agreeing on a common 
system, as they fear losing too much of their tax sovereignty (cf. European Economic and Social 
Committee, 2011, para. 3.6). A possible way of assigning more sovereignty to the Member States 
would be to entitle them to determine the weights of apportionment factors on their own instead of 
applying uniform formulas in all jurisdictions. In line therewith, Michel Aujean, the former director of 
the tax policy department at the European Commission, recommended leaving the decision on how to 
weight each of the apportionment factors to the Member States (cf. Aujean cited by Weiner, 2008b). 
Furthermore, Anand and Sansing (2000) suggest that “a move towards a system of formulary 
apportionment in which formulary weights are equalized across countries is likely to be fragile”. They 
justify this claim with different underlying economic characteristics of the jurisdictions that 
incentivize the jurisdictions to deviate from a uniform formula. Anand and Sansing’s study focuses on 
US states, which are likely to be more homogenous in their economic makeup than EU Member 
States. Thus, they expect that incentives to deviate from a uniform system will be even stronger within 
EU Member States. 
Nevertheless, in the end, the idea of individually-determined factor weights was not included in the 
current CCCTB proposal. The CCCTB Working Group stated that it “[…] is extremely important that 
the formula is uniform across all M[ember] S[tates], i.e., that M[ember] S[tates] should not be allowed 
to apply domestic variations to the formula by attributing different weights to the formula” (CCCTB 
Working Group, 2007, p. 6). However, as long as the Member States cannot agree on a common 
formula, it is likely that the idea of individually-determined factor weights will continue to be debated 
in the EU tax reform discussion.  
In the following, I refer to a system under which all jurisdictions are bound to use the exact same 
formula as the “common system”. If each jurisdiction is allowed to determine the weights on the 
factors individually (“individual system”), then the share of the group tax base that is subject to 
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taxation depends on two conditions: the factor weights and the share of each factor prevalent in each 
jurisdiction. Under a system of individually-determined factor weights per jurisdiction, more or less 
than 100% of the overall group tax base can be subject to taxation. Thus, depending on the factor 
weights and the allocation of factors among the jurisdictions, MJGs can be advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the individual system, since they may have to pay either more or less taxes than 
under the common system. Since the jurisdictions are free to change the factor weights under the 
individual system at any time and thereby determine the tax-liable share of the group tax base, the 
individual system results in tax base uncertainty. By contrast, the common system does not produce 
tax base uncertainty since all jurisdictions are bound to apply exactly the same formula. Hence, even if 
jurisdictions agree on changing their common apportionment formula, it is still guaranteed that exactly 
100% of the overall group tax base is tax-liable. MJGs have to consider the uncertainty implied by the 
individual system for their future tax and financial planning. 
In this paper I examine how the uncertainty in the design of apportionment formulas impacts the tax-
liable share of the tax base and consequently the expected after-tax income of a MJG. As a 
consequence of this uncertainty, future factor weights are likely to develop as a random walk with up- 
and downward movements. By assuming equal tax rates in all jurisdictions, I focus on the share of the 
overall group tax base that is subject to taxation. I compare the (expected) after-tax income of MJGs 
under the individual and the common system, using the results under the common system as a 
benchmark. I model a two-jurisdictions-two-group-entities setting and refer to the (expected) after-tax 
future value as the criterion representing the expected future income of the group.  
I find that uncertainty ambiguously affects MJGs income expectations and is likely to prevent efficient 
tax planning. Uncertainty increases the expectations about the after-tax income under the individual 
system for a profit-making MJG. In such a case the expected future values increase with increasing 
factor weight uncertainty. These results contradict the rather popular view that tax uncertainty 
generally dampens future income expectations (cf. for example, Bloom et al., 2013, IHK, 2013, Misik, 
2012). The surprising outcomes are driven by interest effects in multiperiodical settings. 
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The results may be helpful for policy makers debating the design of a formulary apportionment 
system, and also for MJGs that are located in jurisdictions considering the implementation of such a 
system. Since EU Member States have not yet been willing to agree on the CCCTB as proposed by the 
EC, the idea of an individual formula design by each Member State may merit further discussion. 
From the analysis some conclusions about potential responses of MJGs to such a system can be 
derived. Furthermore, the results may promote discussions about the formula design in countries, that 
already apply formulary apportionment systems, i.e. Switzerland, Canada, the US and Germany. 
After providing an overview of the relevant literature in the following section, I explain the model in 
Section 3. First, I introduce a model to determine the future value under the common system; and then 
for the expected future value under the individual system. Subsequently, in Section 4, I present the 
results on the impact of uncertainty on the expected future value of MJGs. Section 5 summarizes and 
interprets the findings. 
2 Literature 
There are two streams of literature to which this study contributes: on the one hand, literature that 
focuses on the impact of tax uncertainty on investment decisions; on the other, literature related to the 
design of apportionment formulas for allocating group tax bases within jurisdictions.  
There is a vast body of analytical and empirical literature concerned with tax uncertainty3 yet to my 
knowledge there is no paper that addresses uncertainty resulting from the uncoordinated tax allocation 
between jurisdictions. From a practical point of view, formulary apportionment is becoming 
increasingly important as a mechanism for tax base allocation but has not yet been thoroughly 
investigated analytically. It is therefore crucial to develop a suitable theoretical framework to study the 
effects that arise from tax allocation uncertainty.  
Much of this literature explores the effects of tax rate or tax base uncertainty on investment behavior. 
Niemann (2004) analyzes the impact of uncertainty in tax rates on individual investment behavior. In 
                                                            
3  For a brief overview on analytical research on the interplay of uncertainty and taxes see, for example, Alvarez 
and Koskela, 2008. Cf. further, MacKie-Mason, 1990, Alvarez et al., 1998, Sureth, 2002, Niemann/Sureth, 
2004, Gries et al., 2012. An overview about the empirical literature provide, for example, Blouin et al., 2012, 
Stomberg, 2013, Edmiston, 2004. 
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line with my approach, he uses a binomial process to capture uncertainty. He compares expected after-
tax future values of a real and a financial investment project under uncertain future tax rates. The 
outcome of the analysis is ambiguous: depending on the cash flow and depreciation streams, real 
investment may be encouraged or discouraged. Congruent with my results, he finds that the impact of 
the tax rate uncertainty on the expected future value is positive for a positive tax base. Taking 
irreversibility into account, Niemann (2011) probes the effects of tax uncertainty on investment 
behavior. Tax rate and tax base uncertainty is represented by tax payments that follow an arithmetic 
Brownian motion. Furthermore, stochastic cash flows are also assumed to follow an arithmetic 
Brownian motion. He finds that increased tax rate uncertainty does not necessarily delay investment. 
Auerbach and Hines (1988) examine historical patterns of corporate investment incentives in the US 
and find that expectations about uncertain future tax changes significantly affect the investment 
incentives only if adjustment costs were low. In a broader setting, Agliardi (2001) and Panteghini and 
Scarpa (2003) focus on policy changes in general instead of tax changes in particular. They find that 
regulatory risk has ambiguous effects on investment decisions. Congruent with my results, they show 
that regulatory risk does not necessarily have negative consequences.4 
Another stream of the literature on uncertainty focuses on the impact uncertainty in tax parameters has 
on welfare. This literature also plays an important role in the present analysis, as welfare and 
(expected) future income of MJGs are to some extent related. In this respect, Alm (1988) examines 
how individuals respond to greater uncertainty concerning individual income tax. He distinguishes 
between tax base and tax rate uncertainty and finds that simply altering the likelihood of possible 
changes in tax policy already has an effect on investment behavior, even if the changes are not made in 
the end. A greater tax base risk may increase the expected tax collections of the government. Skinner 
(1989) investigates the impact of uncertain tax policy on savings, labor supply, and welfare in the US. 
He finds that removing future tax policy uncertainty can result in an annual welfare gain of 0.4 percent 
of national income.  
                                                            
4  For more literature on regulatory uncertainty see Pawlina/Kort, 2005 and Bloom et al., 2007. See also Gries et 
al., 2012. 
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The second literature stream pertinent to this study analyzes formulary apportionment and factor 
weights. Some studies investigate the externalities resulting from uncoordinated factor weights. While 
I focus on the consequences of the externalities for the after-tax income, the existing literature centers 
mostly on consequences for social welfare in a game theoretic framework.  
In this regard, Anand and Sansing (2000) examine theoretically why jurisdictions choose different 
weights in the apportionment formula for corporate income tax purposes. They find that the aggregate 
social welfare is maximized when all states use exactly the same formula. However, since a state can 
increase its individual welfare by deviating from this formula, it has a unilateral incentive to do so. 
Furthermore, Anand and Sansing show that, depending on their industrial makeup, jurisdictions follow 
different strategies to set the factor weights.  
Furthermore, Weiner (2008) and Edmiston (2002) give suggestions for the design of formulary 
apportionment systems based on the experiences gained in the US. Weiner (2008) recommends that 
EU Member States should attempt to agree on a coordinated formula; otherwise they may face 
prisoner’s dilemma where each Member State makes the others worse off by trying to reach its 
individual revenue goals. Weiner further states that side payments should be made between Member 
States for the sake of reaching a coordinated solution. Using US data, Edmiston (2002) examines how 
the factor choice of a state impacts choices of other states. Using an applied general equilibrium 
model, she finds that the best economic development strategy of a given state is to choose a single-
factor sales formula. However, this beneficial effect is supposedly short-term since the other states 
may change their formulas as well. Therefore, Edmiston suggests that states would be better off had 
they not started to play the “strategic apportionment formula” game. While both Weiner and Edmiston 
suggest applying a common formulary apportionment system from a social welfare point of view, the 
results of my study indicate that their suggestions are not necessarily preferable from a firm level point 
of view. 
3 Model 
I consider a MJG that is conducting business in two different jurisdictions. One group entity is located 
in jurisdiction 1 and the other entity in jurisdiction 2. The MJG faces the hypothetical decision of 
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whether to carry out a real investment under the common system or under the individual system. The 
investment is assumed to generate yearly cash flows and depreciation. Interest payments are taxed 
similarly to regular business income. Furthermore, I assume that surplus liquid funds are reinvested in 
the capital market. If the group is short on funds, it may borrow funds from the capital market to fill 
the gap. The pre-tax debit interest rate is assumed to be equal to the pre-tax credit interest rate.  
It is postulated that both jurisdictions have agreed on allocating the overall group tax base to the 
respective entities by formulary apportionment. I assume the application of a three-factor 
apportionment formula, as implemented in the US or as proposed for the CCCTB project, with the 
factors sales ሺݏሻ, labor ሺ݈ሻ and assets (ܽሻ5. The sum of these three factor weights amounts always to 
100% per jurisdiction. Whereas the labor factor only consists of payrolls in the US, it consists under 
the proposed CCCTB of equal shares of payrolls and number of employees. However, since the labor 
factor ݈ is exogenously given in my model, its particular makeup is not crucial for the analysis. The 
share of each factor that is apportioned to the entity located in jurisdiction 1 is determined as follows: 
ܽ ൌ ௔௦௦௘௧௦	௢௙	௘௡௧௜௧௬	ଵ௔௦௦௘௧௦	௢௙	௧௛௘	௘௡௧௜௥௘	௚௥௢௨௣, (1a) 
݈ ൌ ௟௔௕௢௥	௢௙	௘௡௧௜௧௬	ଵ௟௔௕௢௥	௢௙	௧௛௘	௘௡௧௜௥௘	௚௥௢௨௣, (1b) 
ݏ ൌ ௦௔௟௘௦	௢௙	௘௡௧௜௧௬	ଵ௦௔௟௘௦	௢௙	௧௛௘	௘௡௧௜௥௘	௚௥௢௨௣. (1c) 
The factor shares ܽ, ݈ and ݏ take on values between zero and one and are assumed to be constant over 
time. In fact, rational market actors are expected to make use of preferential tax effects and respond to 
changed factor weights by shifting labor and assets. However, the assumption of constant factor shares 
is, at least in the short-term perspectives, widely in line with empirical evidence6 and rules out any 
                                                            
5  On the US state level the factor is called “property”. The definitions of the asset factor under the CCCTB 
system and the property factor on the US state level are pretty much identical. I refer to this factor in line with 
the CCCTB wording as the asset factor. This is just an issue of wording and has no impact on the results. 
6  Several studies examine behavioral changes associated with changed factor weights on the US state level. 
While some studies find no significant behavioral responses, i.e., Weiner (1994) and Lightner (1999), others 
identify small reactions, i.e., Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) and Gupta and Hofmann (2000). In a cross-
sectional study, Weiner finds no association between the apportionment formula design and investments in that 
state. In a further study from 1999 she finds an association yet the effects are tiny and only marginally 
significant. Moreover, Lightner (1999) examines the impact of the apportionment formula on employment 
growth yet also finds no significant association between them. However, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) use a 
richer and more detailed panel data set than Lightner and find that reducing the weight of the labor factor from 
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kind of real activity shifting from the analysis. Disregarding real activity shifting allows for the 
separation of behavioral effects and uncertainty effects inherent in the individual system. Nonetheless, 
due to this assumption, my results may be biased towards the disadvantage of the individual system, as 
the expected after-tax future cash flows would be higher if the MJG could respond to changes in factor 
weights. 
The share ܽ becomes one if only the entity located in jurisdiction 1 has assets and the entity located in 
jurisdiction 2 has none. The share of each factor apportioned to entity 2 is obtained by subtracting the 
share of the respective factor in jurisdiction 1 from one. Thus, in the previously mentioned example 
the share of assets held by entity 2 is equal to zero. I assume that jurisdictions determine the weight ߛ 
on the sales factor and allocate the remaining weights equally on the asset and labor factor ሺଵିఊଶ ሻ. 
Thus, the weight of the sales factor determines the weights on the asset and labor factor as well. This 
approach is in line with the setting of factor weights in all states of the US and with the proposed 
CCCTB system in Europe. Consequently, taxes that have to be paid in jurisdiction 1 ሺܶܲሻଵ are 
determined as follows: 
ܶ ଵܲ ൌ ቀߛ ൉ ݏ ൅ ଵିఊଶ ሺ݈ ൅ ܽሻቁ ܶܤ ൉ ߬			with  ܶܤ ൌ ܥܨ െ ܦ, (2) 
where ܶܤ denotes the group tax base, ܥܨ the cash flows, ܦ the depreciation and ߬ the tax rate. 
Assuming equal tax rates7 (cf. Anand/Sansing, 2000, p. 186.) in both jurisdictions allows me to focus 
on the share of the group tax base that is subject to taxation. Further ambiguous effects resulting from 
the interaction of tax rate differences and tax bases are thereby eliminated from the analysis. A time 
horizon of two periods is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, as the results are systematically 
similar for broader time horizons.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
one third to one fourth significantly increases manufacturing employment in an average state by 1.1%. 
Furthermore, Gupta and Hofmann (2000) find that the elasticity of corporations’ new capital expenditures in 
the manufacturing sector ranges between 0.05 to 0.35 depending on the income tax burden on property 
(measured as the product of the property factor weight and the statutory tax rate). Even in the studies that find 
behavioral adjustments of companies to changed apportionment factors, the effects are rather small. Thus, in 
line with the empirical literature, I believe it is justifiable to neglect them in this analysis. 
7  As a starting point, this simplifying assumption is also made by Nielsen et al., 2010, p. 131.  
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In the following, I assume risk neutral decisions-makers.8 Even though the examination of risk-averse 
decision-makers would be desirable, I assume risk neutral ones here for the following reason. As I 
compare a system that results in a tax base risk (individual system) with a system that is fully certain 
with respect to the tax-liable share of the tax base (common system), the direction of impact of risk 
aversion is clear and unambiguous: higher risk aversion makes the individual system relatively less 
attractive compared to the common system. Therefore, accounting for risk-averse decision makers 
would not bring any valuable insights but would rather add a lot of complexity to the model. In order 
to focus on the inherent effects of the individual system and to keep the model as simple as possible I 
assume risk neutral decision-makers. However, due to this assumption my results may be biased in 
favor of the individual system. 
3.1 Common system 
Assuming that both jurisdictions have agreed on a common formula, the after-tax net cash flow of the 
group in each period ݐ is determined as follows: 
ܰܥܨ௧ ൌ ܥܨ௧ െ ܶܤ௧ ൉ ߬ ቀߛ ൉ ݏ ൅ ଵିఊଶ ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ߛ	ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ଵିఊଶ 	ሺ1 െ ܽ ൅ 1 െ ݈ቁ  
ൌ ܥܨ௧ െ ܶܤ௧ ൉ ߬. tax base factor =1 (3) 
The net cash flow ܰܥܨ is reflected by the gross cash flow ܥܨ minus the tax payment. The tax 
payment is calculated by the tax base multiplied with the corporate tax rate ߬ and the tax base factor, 
which determines the tax-liable share of the group tax base. This share is, in case of a common 
formula, always equal to one.  
In a two-period setting, I obtain the following future value of the net cash flows: 
ܨ ଶܸ௖௢௠ ൌ ∑ ሺܥܨ௧ െ ܶܤ௧ ൉ ߬ሻ ൉ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሻଶି௧ଶ௧ୀଵ . (4) 
                                                            
8  This assumption is widely used in public economics. Cf. Niemann/Sureth, 2002, p. 1. For a study of tax effects 
on investment decisions under risk aversion and the involved methodological limitations see, for example, 
Niemann/Sureth, 2004, 2005. 
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The future value measures the nominal future sum of money that today`s net cash flow is worth at a 
specified time in the future assuming that it will be invested in the capital market at the pre-tax interest 
rate ݅.  
3.2 Individual system 
Under the individual system, under which both jurisdictions can set the factor weights individually, the 
share of the overall group tax base that is subject to taxation depends on the factor weights in each 
jurisdiction and the allocation of the factors among the group entities. The following example clarifies 
how the variation in factor weights and the allocation of the factors among the entities determine the 
share of the tax-liable group tax base. I assume exemplarily that jurisdiction 1 applies a single-factor 
formula consisting only of the sales factor (ߛ ൌ 1) and jurisdiction 2 the Massachusetts Formula 
(ߛ ൌ 1/3). 
 jurisdiction 1 jurisdiction 2 
Factor  Weight  Share  Weight  Share  
Assets 0 0.7 1/3 0.3 
Labor 0 0.3 1/3 0.7 
Sales 1 0.8 1/3 0.2 
Share subject to taxation  80% 40% 
Sum 120% 
 
Table 1: Example on how the interplay of factor weights and the allocation of the factors within the MJG determine the share 
of the tax-liable group tax base  
 
In this example 120% of the group tax base is subject to taxation. Thus, the MJG has to pay more 
taxes under the individual system than under the common system. However, if the share of the sales 
factor amounts to 20% (instead of 80%) in jurisdiction 1 and to 80% (instead of 20%) in jurisdiction 2, 
then only 80% (instead of 120%) of the group tax base will be tax-liable. If, in the example as 
displayed in Tab. 1, jurisdiction 1 uses a single-factor formula consisting of labor instead of sales, then 
only 70% of the group tax base will be subject to taxation. In tendency, more than 100% of the group 
tax base is tax-liable if a major share of a factor is located in a jurisdiction that heavily weights this 
factor. 
Experience gained in the US has shown that if jurisdictions deviate from the equally weighted 
Massachusetts Formula, they increase the weight of the sales factor and lower the weight of the 
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remaining factors. Jurisdictions do so in order to promote economic development in their respective 
state. By increasing the weight of the sales factor and decreasing the weights of the labor and asset 
factor, the MJG is not “penalized” for investing in assets or hiring employees (cf. KPMG, 2012, p. 1, 
Multistate Tax Commission, 2003, p. 25). Many US states use the so called double-weighted sales 
formula, which weights the sales factor with 50% and the remaining two factors each with 25%. Other 
states weight the sales factor even higher and some states use it as the only determinant in a single-
factor formula. In all US states the weight of the factor asset is equal to that of the labor factor.  
Whereas on average the sales factor has the highest weight of the three formula factors in the US, it is 
not even part of the formula used in Germany to apportion the tax base of the trade tax. The German 
trade tax is apportioned according to a single-factor formula consisting of labor. In Canada a common 
formula consisting of the two factors labor and sales is applied. Both factors are weighted equally. In 
Switzerland, moreover, industry-specific formulas are used. Whereas, e.g. the formula for the 
manufacturing sector consists only of the factors capital and labor, the formula for the commerce 
sector contains only the sales factor. Thus, overall, it is apparent that, contrary to experience gained in 
the US, the sales factor is not the main driver for the tax base allocation under all worldwide existing 
formulary apportionment systems. Under formula apportionment systems in other countries the sales 
factor plays a rather minor or no role for the tax base allocation.  
Since jurisdictions may change the factor weights, the weights are uncertain for future periods in both 
jurisdictions under the individual system. As a consequence of the uncertainty, future factor weights 
are likely to develop as a random walk with up- and downward movements. However, even if each 
jurisdiction can potentially change its factor weights in each period by any amount a fundamental 
change is rather unlikely. Experiences gained in the US show that the states have changed their factor 
weights in the past by increment. Arizona is an example of a state that slowly increased the weight on 
the sales factor. Originally, Arizona applied the equally-weighted Massachusetts-Formula. In 2009 it 
introduced a double-weighted sales formula and simultaneously offered an alternative formula 
consisting of a sales factor weighted by 80% and an asset and labor factors weighted by 10% each. 
Finally, in 2014, Arizona implemented a single-sales formula (cf. Tax Management BNA, 2014a, p. 
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8). The development of statutory tax rates in European countries suggests the same jurisdictional 
reform strategy as on the US state level. The European countries frequently adjust their statutory tax 
rates. Nevertheless, they adjust their rates only in small steps (cf. European Union, 2014, p. 37). 
Germany, e.g. in 1998, had a statutory tax rate on corporate proftis of 56%, which was decreased by 
about 4 percentage points in 1999 (cf. European Union, 2014, p. 37). In 2001 the rate was decreased 
further to a level of about 38%. Since the tax reform act in 2008 corporate profits are subject to an 
overall profit tax at a rate of about 30%. These US and European examples show that jurisdictions 
tend to implement rather small changes in tax systems. In line with this evidence, I assume small 
changes in the factor weights. These changes are captured by the constant ∆, which represents the 
average change in factor weights in both jurisdictions.  
Factor weights are assumed to undergo discrete jumps in discrete time with a discrete state space. The 
annual upward or downward movement of the state variable sales factor weight ߛ by the constant ∆ is 
characteristic of a binomial process. Thus, an additive binomial process seems to be adequate to catch 
uncertainty.9 The factor weight at time ݐ ൌ 1 is  
ߛ ൅ ∆ with probability ݌ and 
ߛ െ ∆ with probability 1 െ ݌. 
To ensure that the factor weights vary only between zero and one the following condition must hold: 
ߛ െ ܶ ൉ ∆	൒ 0			˄			ߛ ൅ ܶ ൉ ∆		൑ 1. 
ܶ denotes the MJG’s time horizon. For reasons of simplicity an immediate full loss offset is assumed. 
In my analysis, I distinguish between two different scenarios. In the first scenario, I assume that both 
jurisdictions set factor weights completely independent of each other. In the second scenario, it is 
assumed that the weights on the sales factor are perfectly negatively correlated between both 
jurisdictions. This implies that one jurisdiction decreases the weight of the sales factor if the other 
                                                            
9  In principle, it would be also adequate to implement a multiplicative binomial process to generate the upward- 
and downward movement of the state variable. This approach would lead to similar results. However, in line 
with the approach used by Niemann (2004) and for reasons of comparison and a better intuitive understanding 
of the subject matter, I use an additive process. 
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jurisdiction increases it correspondingly. The object of research in this paper rules out an analysis of 
positively correlated factor weights as they preclude any tax base uncertainty. Disregarding perfectly 
positively correlated factor weights is supported by practical experience gained in the US: even 
decades after implementing the possibility to deviate from the Massachusetts Formula, the 
apportionment formulas still vary greatly between states (cf. Tax Management BNA, 2014, p. 8). 
The deviations between factor weights within jurisdictions can be explained by game theory. In line 
with Anand and Sansing (2000), Weiner (2008a), and Mintz and Weiner (2008), jurisdictions’ 
decisions on how to set factor weights can be interpreted as a game in which each jurisdiction tries to 
maximize its individual tax revenues. The literature stream examining game theory essentially 
provides two differing arguments explaining deviating factor weights between jurisdictions: the 
different industrial makeup of the states (cf. Anand and Sansing, 2000) and differing taxation goals, 
i.e., revenue maximizing or investment promoting strategies (cf. Weiner, 2008, p. 106). 
First, against the trend in the last decades at the US state level, Anand and Sansing (2000) find that 
“the simple prediction that all states will have incentives to increase sales factor […] is generally 
wrong” since “states will […] have unilateral incentives to deviate from any […] coordinated 
solution”. According to Anand and Sansing, the variation in different factor weights within 
jurisdictions results from unique underlying characteristics of the jurisdictions. They argue that the 
variations within factor weights in the US are explained by the different taxation objectives of the 
jurisdictions: some aim to tax immobile capital, such as natural resources and agriculture, while others 
prefer to tax mobile capital from manufacturing. The heterogeneity across states, with respect to 
natural resources, leads to different weighting strategies between the states: states exporting output 
from immobile capital tend to put less weight on the sales factor, while importing states tend to 
implement the opposite. Second, Lightner (1999) points out that jurisdictions have two conflicting 
goals when it comes to choosing factor weights. If the only aim of a jurisdiction is to increase tax 
revenues, it may increase the weights of the factors that are prevalent in that jurisdiction. Conversely, 
if a jurisdiction aims to attract new economic development it is well advised to reduce the weights on 
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the decisive factors. Thus, each jurisdiction’s differing economic aims and underlying physical 
characteristics may hinder them from aligning their factor weights 
3.2.1 Uncorrelated factor weights between both jurisdictions 
In the first scenario I assume that no jurisdiction takes the weighting decisions of the other jurisdiction 
into account. This assumption is in line with some empirical evidence found in the tax competition 
literature. A change in the weight of apportionment factors can be interpreted as a change in the 
effective corporate tax rate of the jurisdiction. Thus, allocation factor competition is a stylized form of 
tax competition. In an EU 15 setting, Ruiz and Gerard (2008) investigate the strategic interaction of 
the Member States with respect to effective tax rates. They find only limited evidence for strategic 
interactions. Furthermore, in a broader EU 27 setting, Overesch and Rincke (2011) cannot find 
evidence to support strategic interaction in effective tax rates. Both studies support the assumption that 
changes in factor weights, which represent a specific kind of changes in effective tax rates, do not 
affect factor weights in other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, assuming uncorrelated factor weights is reasonable in specific industries, e.g. in the setting 
described previously by Anand and Sansing. In a two-jurisdiction setting, one jurisdiction is assumed 
to generate tax revenues mainly from taxing companies that process natural resources (e.g. agriculture, 
mining, forestry or fishery). Since companies that generate income by processing natural resources are 
highly unlikely to be able to shift their business to another more tax-advantageous jurisdiction, their 
home jurisdiction needs not fear that they will resettle; the other jurisdiction needs not to try to attract 
these companies. Thus, since behavioral adjustments of such companies can be practically ruled out, 
both jurisdictions are free to set the weight of the factors independently of each other. 
In a one-period setting there are four possible combinations for the different developments of sales 
factor weights in each jurisdiction. Either the weights are raised in both jurisdictions by the constant Δ 
with the probability ݌, or they are reduced by both jurisdictions with the probability ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ, or they 
are raised by one jurisdiction and reduced by the other one. Here, the constant Δ can be interpreted as 
the magnitude of the factor weight uncertainty.  
16 
 
In a one period setting, the expected after-tax net cash flow under the individual system is – 
independent of the probability ݌ – equal to the after-tax net cash flow under the common system. 
When calculating the expected after-tax net cash flow under the individual system, the four different 
combinations of factor weight developments add up to zero. In a two-period setting the combination of 
the binomial trees and the resulting possible future weight developments in jurisdiction 1 and 2 are 
exemplified for the sales factor in Fig. 1. Since in this scenario the jurisdictions set the factor weights 
independently of each other, there is no correlation between the binomial trees of jurisdiction 1 and 2. 
The binomial process of the factor weights in each jurisdiction begins with a sales factor weight of ߛ. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Since I consider changes in the factor weights in annual intervals and since the magnitude of the 
changes is constant (Δ), the branches of the binomial trees always recombine. Each binomial tree 
shows four different weighting developments that result in three final states. For my analysis the 
weighting developments are crucial. Thus, there are 4 x 4 (=16) different combinations of factor 
weighting developments in jurisdiction 1 and 2 in two periods. 
 
In order to determine the expected future value for the weighting developments illustrated in Fig. 1 the 
future value of each branch has to be calculated by considering the probability ݌. For demonstration 
purposes the following model shows exemplarily the determination of the future value for a specific 
path, taking into account the probability ݌. The path is characterized by a raise in the sales factor 
weight in jurisdiction 1 and a reduction in jurisdiction 2 for the first period, followed by a reduction in 
both jurisdictions in the second period. 
ܨ ଶܸ௜௡ௗ೐ೣೌ೘೛೗೐ ൌ ሾܥܨଵ (5) 
െܶܤଵ ൉ ߬ ൬ሺߛ ൅ ݌	∆ሻ	ݏ ൅ ቀଵିఊଶ െ ݌	 ∆ଶቁ ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ሺߛ െ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ	∆ሻ	ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ቀଵିఊଶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ∆ଶቁ ሺ1 െ ܽ ൅ 1 െ ݈ሻ൰ቃ  
 tax payments in t=1 
൉ ቈ1 ൅ ݅	 ቆ1 െ ߬	 ൬ߛ ൉ 	ݏ ൅ 1െߛ2 	ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ሺߛ െ 2	ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ2	∆ሻ	ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ቀ
1െߛ
2 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ2	߂ቁ ሺ1 െ ܽ ൅ 1 െ ݈ሻ൰ቇ቉  
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 after-tax interest rate in t=2 
൅ܥܨଶ െ ܶܤଶ ൉ ߬ ൬ߛ ൉ 	ݏ ൅ ଵିఊଶ ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ሺߛ െ 2	ሺ1 െ ݌ሻଶ	∆ሻ	ሺ1 െ ݏሻ ൅ ቀଵିఊଶ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻଶ	߂ቁ ሺ1 െ ܽ ൅ 1 െ ݈ሻ൰.  
after-tax cash flow in t=2 
The first three lines of eq. (5) display the compounded first periods’ net cash flow. It becomes clear 
that the factor weights of the second period also determine the share of the interest payment that is 
subject to taxation. The last line of eq. (5) displays the share of the group tax base that is tax-liable in 
the second period. 
 
By transforming and summarizing the formulas for all 16 branches, I obtain the following equation for 
the expected future value under the individual system after two periods.  
ܧ ቂܨ ଶܸ௜௡ௗೠ೙೎೚ೝೝቃ ൌ ሺܥܨଵ െ ܶܤଵ ൉ ߬ሻ	൫1 ൅ ݅ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ൯ ൅ ܶܤଵ ൉ ߬ଶ ൉ ∆ଶ ൉ ݅ ቀݏ െ ଵଶ	ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻቁ
ଶ ൉ ቀଵଶ െ ݌ ൅ ݌ଶቁ  
൅ܥܨଶ െ ܶܤଶ ൉ ߬. uncertainty term (6) 
In eq. (6), the expected future value is a function of the factor weight uncertainty captured by the 
constant ∆. As becomes apparent in eq. (5), each of the 16 future values represented by the branches of 
the binomial tree is calculated by multiplying each net cash flow of the first period with the 
corresponding after-tax interest rates of the second period. The weighting developments of the second 
period also determine the after-tax interest rate, since interest payments are taxed similar to regular 
business income.  
In the second period, some of the weighting developments cannot occur anymore, as they are already 
ruled out by the developments in the first period. Consequently, developments in the first period 
predetermine, to some extent, those of the second period. This implies that, for example, high first 
periods’ after-tax net cash flows (due to low tax payments) tend to be multiplied with high after-tax 
interest rates in the second period. The opposite is true for low first periods’ after-tax net cash flows. 
Thus, the interest effect increases the differences in the after-tax net cash flows of the first period to a 
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different degree. Owing to this interplay between the low/high first period’s after-tax cash flows and 
the low/high second period’s after-tax interest rates, the net cash flows of the 16 weighting 
developments no longer completely cancel each other out. In essence, the high first period’s after-tax 
cash flows multiplied with the high second period’s after-tax interest rates overcompensate the low 
first period’s after-tax cash flows multiplied with the low second period’s after-tax interest rates and 
hence they do not add up to zero. In this two-jurisdiction, two-entity-setting, six out of 16 branches do 
not vanish, thus determine the uncertainty term. Without interest effects, the (expected) future value 
under the individual system would be similar to that under the common system.  
The impact of the factor weight uncertainty depends on the tax rate τ, the interest rate ݅, the allocation 
of the factors ܽ, ݈ and ݏ, the probability ݌ and on the tax base ܶܤଵ in the first period. Note that the 
impact of the factor weight uncertainty does not depend on the value of the (initial) weight of the sales 
factor ߛ. The particular design of the (initial) apportionment formula is not decisive in this setting as 
tax rate differentials have not been taken into account. For determining the expected tax-liable share of 
the group tax base under the individual system, it is only the potential deviations in the design of 
apportionment formulas between both jurisdictions which matter. Since the tax rate ߬, the interest rate 
݅ and the probability ݌ take on values between 0 and 1 these factors cannot negatively impact the 
uncertainty term. However, their magnitude determines the level of the impact of the factor weight 
uncertainty on the expected future value. The higher the tax and interest rates and the more the 
probability ݌ deviates from 0.5, the higher the impact of the factor weight uncertainty on the expected 
future value.  
In case of a positive/negative first periods’ tax base the uncertainty impacts the expected future value 
positively/negatively. A positive (negative) tax base of the first period leads to a positive (negative) 
impact of the factor weight uncertainty on the expected future value. The impact of the factor weight 
uncertainty depends also on the allocation of the factors ܽ, ݈ and ݏ between the two jurisdictions. The 
more unequal the share of the sales factor ݏ on the one hand and the sum of the labor ݈ and asset ܽ 
factors on the other hand are distributed within each jurisdiction, the higher the impact of the factor 
weight uncertainty on the expected future value. Thus, the impact of the factor weight uncertainty is at 
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its peak when the share of the sales factor ݏ is one, and the sum of the factors asset ܽ and labor ݈ is 
zero in one of the two jurisdictions (ݏ ൌ 1 and ܽ ൅ ݈ ൌ 0	or ݏ ൌ 0 and ܽ ൅ ݈ ൌ 1ሻ. If the sum of the 
factors asset ܽ and labor ݈ is equal to the share of the sales factor		ݏ ሺܽ ൅ ݈ ൌ ݏሻ in each jurisdiction, 
then the uncertainty term becomes zero and factor weight uncertainty does not affect the expected 
future value. In this case, the (expected) future value under the individual system is similar to that 
under the common system. 
3.2.2 Negatively correlated factor weights between jurisdictions 
In line with the argumentation of Lightner (1999), it is also conceivable that factor weights between 
jurisdictions are perfectly negatively correlated (factor െ1). Jurisdictions that focus on generating tax 
revenues from the same kind of immobile capital, such as manufacturing, may have opposing 
weighting strategies. While one jurisdiction may aim to heavily tax the prevalent companies by setting 
high weights on the asset and labor factor, the other jurisdiction may want to attract new economic 
development by setting extra low weights on the asset and labor factor.10 Furthermore, jurisdictions 
may want to differentiate from each other in order to exploit more exclusive taxing niches.  
Another reason for negatively correlated factor weights can be found in the general tax competition 
literature. As a change in factor weights can be reinterpreted as a change in effective corporate tax 
rates (see Section 3.2.1), it is reasonable to refer to this literature stream. Gordon (1992), Bucovetsky 
(1991) and Wilson (1991) model tax competition between countries that are unequal in size. 
Bucovetsky and Wilson conclude that smaller countries set lower tax rates, while Gordon, in turn, 
concludes that large countries set higher tax rates. Both papers together support my assumption of 
negatively correlated effective tax rates between jurisdictions, as illustrated here by the example of 
large and small countries. 
Fig. 2 shows the combination of the possible weighting developments for opposing weighting 
strategies of the jurisdictions. Since in this scenario the weighting decisions of both jurisdictions are 
correlated by the factor ሺെ1ሻ, the factor weights in jurisdiction 2 are dependent on that in jurisdiction 
                                                            
10 Goolsbee/Maydew, 2000, find that a reduction in the payroll factor weight from one third to one quarter 
increases manufacturing employment around 1,1%. 
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1 for each period. In order to indicate the relation between the weight setting developments of 
jurisdiction 1 and 2, I use different types of lines for the binomial trees in the following figure. The 
weighting developments in jurisdiction 2 must follow the same pattern of lines as the weighting 
developments in jurisdiction 1 over time. Because of the correlation between the weighting processes 
of both jurisdictions the number of possible combinations of future factor weight developments has 
decreased to four (compared to 16 in case of uncorrelated factor weights). The thin grey lines of the 
binomial trees in jurisdiction 2 indicate that these branches of the trees are irrelevant for the analysis in 
this section. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
 
By transforming and summarizing the formulas for the future value of the four possible weighting 
developments, the following model for the expected after-tax future value is obtained: 
ܧቂܨ ଶܸ௜௡ௗ೎೚ೝೝ:	షభቃ ൌ ሺܥܨଵ െ ܶܤଵ ൉ ߬ሻ ൉ ൫1 ൅ ݅ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ൯ ൅ 2	ܶܤଵ ൉ ߬ଶ ൉ ∆ଶ ൉ ݅ ቀݏ െ ଵଶ ∗ ሺܽ ൅ ݈ሻቁ
ଶ ൉ ቀଵଶ െ ݌ ൅ ݌ଶቁ  
൅ܥܨଶ െ ܶܤଶ ൉ ߬. uncertainty term (7) 
In line with the explanation given in Section 3.2.1, the uncertainty term results from some branches of 
the binomial tree that do not cancel each other out. Compared to non-correlated factor weights the 
number of different combinations for weighting developments decreases but the relative share of 
combinations that do not add up to zero anymore increases. Here, two out of four branches do not 
cancel each other out. 
By comparing this model of perfectly negatively correlated factor weights with the model for non-
correlated factor weights, it becomes apparent that both models are, to a large extent, identical. The 
only difference is that the uncertainty term in eq. (7) is multiplied by the factor of 2. Thus, the effects 
explained above hold also true for the model of perfectly negatively correlated factor weights, but the 
impact of the uncertainty on the expected future value of after-tax cash flows is twice as large.  
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4 Results 
By assuming a risk neutral investment decision-maker of the MJG, I can directly compare the 
(expected) future values under both the individual and the common system (eq. (4) and eq. (6)/eq. (7)). 
The future value under the common system serves as a benchmark for the expected future values 
under the individual system.  
The difference in the models for the (expected) future value under both systems (eq. (6)/eq. (7)) is the 
term containing the uncertainty. As described in Section 3.2, only the tax base of the first period 
determines whether the factor weight uncertainty has a positive or negative impact on the expected 
future value under the individual system. If the tax base has a positive (negative) sign, the expected 
future value under the individual system is higher (lower) than the future value under the individual 
system. Moreover, the absolute difference in (expected) future values under both systems increases 
with rising factor weight uncertainty ∆. These results contradict the rather popular view that tax 
uncertainty generally depresses MJG’s expectations about future after-tax income. Under certain 
conditions, the analysis shows that the opposite is true: higher tax uncertainty may even increase 
expectations. The paradoxical tax effects result from the uncertainty itself, and not, as one may 
assume, purely from cases in which undertaxation occurs.11 
Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the (expected) future values under the individual system are at 
least as high (low) as that under the common system in case of a positive (negative) tax base of the 
first period, irrespective of the allocation of the factors sales ݏ, labor ݈ and assets ܽ between the group 
entities. However, the allocation of these factors within the MJG determines the degree of how much 
the (expected) future value under the individual system is higher/lower than that under the common 
system. In case the factors assets ܽ, labor ݈ and sales ݏ are allocated among the group in a way that the 
following relation holds true ݏ ൌ ܽ ൌ ݈, the (expected) future values under both systems become 
equal. The difference in (expected) future values between both systems is maximized if either the sum 
of the asset and labor factors is equal to one ሺܽ ൅ ݈ ൌ 1ሻ and the sales factor ݏ is equal to zero (ݏ ൌ 0) 
or vice versa.  
                                                            
11 Paradoxical effects solely resulting from uncertainty are also found by Gries et al., 2012. 
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The distinction between uncorrelated and perfectly negatively correlated factor weights shows that the 
relation of weighting strategies between jurisdictions impacts the level by which the uncertainty 
affects the expected future income. If the factor weighting process between the jurisdictions is 
perfectly negatively correlated, then the impact of the uncertainty on the expected future value is twice 
as high as if the factor weights were uncorrelated. Thus, perfectly negatively correlated weighting 
strategies result in either higher positive or higher negative differences in (expected) future values 
between the common and the individual system. 
The analysis shows that the positive/negative difference between the (expected) future values under 
the individual and the common system increase with an increasing corporate tax rate ߬ and interest rate 
݅. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the impact of uncertainty on the expected future value increases 
if the probability ݌ for an upward movement of the factor weight deviates more from 0.5. A practical 
example for jurisdictions that tend to have deviating probabilities from ݌ ൌ 0.5 are the states in the 
US: experience shows that US states tend to increase the weight of the sales factor over time. Thus, on 
average, the probability ݌ for an increase in sales factor weights by US states is considerably larger 
than 0.5. The impact of the probability ݌ on the uncertainty term is always positive. Consequently, the 
probability ݌ cannot lead to a change in sign of the uncertainty term. 
As already outlined in the analysis of the individual system, results are mainly driven by after-tax 
interest effects. The applicable after-tax interest rates that are used to compound the cash flows are 
path-dependent as the factor weights also drive the tax burden on interest income. As a consequence 
the after-tax net cash flows compounded to the second period for all possible weighting developments 
may not recombine. As a result of factor weights chosen in the underlying jurisdictions, some 
branches of the binomial tree do not cancel each other out when calculating the future value for each 
weighting development. In tendency, under the individual system, high/low after-tax cash flows are 
compounded with high/low after-tax interest rates. Thus, the assumption of constant weight changes 
over time drives my results to some extent since these weights determine the magnitude of the after-
tax cash flows and the after-tax interest effects and create asymmetric outcomes in the second period. 
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Consequently, the question rises if the results hold also true in a setting with asymmetric binomial 
trees.  
I checked the validity of my results in a robustness test. Therefore, the binomial trees are assumed to 
be skewed similarly in both jurisdictions. I skewed the random walks, e.g., by setting the highest 
possible factor weight on the sales factor up to ߛ ൅ 3∆ (instead of ߛ ൅ 2∆) in the second period 
leaving the downward movement unchanged. I find that my results still generally hold in this setting. 
The impact of the uncertainty on the expected after-tax future income under the individual system 
becomes even stronger the more skewed the decision trees are. This result holds regardless of whether 
the decision tree is skewed in a positive or negative direction. In a further robustness test, I assume 
that the factor weights may not necessarily change on a periodical basis but may also remain on their 
current level. Also in this setting, the basic results hold true but, however, the impact of the 
uncertainty on the expected after-tax cash flows is mitigated. All in all, the robustness tests clarify that 
the identified effects are not restricted to settings with symmetric binomial trees. Irrespective of the 
characteristics of the random walk I find that uncertainty impacts the expected after-tax income 
positively or negatively. However, the magnitude of the impact of uncertainty on the after-tax income 
increases with increased skewness of the binomial tree.  
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine if the uncertainty implied by individually-set factor weights by jurisdictions 
decreases the expectations about future income of a MJG. I compare the (expected) after-tax future 
income of a MJG under a system where all jurisdictions are bound to use exactly the same formula 
(common system) with a system that allows each jurisdiction to determine the weights on the 
apportionment factors individually (individual system). Whereas under a common system always 
exact 100% of the group tax base is subject to taxation, it may be more or less than this under the 
individual system. The tax-liable share of the group tax base depends on the combination of factor 
weights in each jurisdiction and the allocation of the factors within the MJG. Since jurisdictions are 
free to change the factor weights at any time, the individual system contains uncertainty about the 
future tax-liable share of the group tax base and thus also about the future after-tax income. 
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I use a two-jurisdictions-two-entity setting and assume that the tax rates in both jurisdictions are equal. 
The results clarify that factor weight uncertainty affects MJGs expectations about the after-tax future 
income in an ambiguous manner. Counterintuitively, the results show that in case of a positive first 
period’s tax base the (expected) after-tax income under the individual system is higher than that under 
the common system. In case of a negative first period’s tax base the opposite is true. Thus, the factor 
weight uncertainty affects the expected future income negatively for companies that are likely to incur 
initial losses (as start-up firms typically do) and positively for economically successful, profit-making 
companies. Furthermore, I find that the expected future values increase under the individual system 
with increasing factor weight uncertainty in case of a positive first periods’ tax base. Thus, the results 
are contrary to the popular view that uncertainty reduces expectations about future after-tax income. 
Moreover, the results show that regardless of how the factors assets, labor and sales are allocated 
between the group entities, they cannot influence the uncertainty term negatively. The same is true for 
the tax rate ߬, the interest rate ݅ and the probability ݌ by which the sales factor weights are raised. 
However, they determine the degree by which the (expected) future values under both systems differ. 
Furthermore, the relation of the weighting strategies between the jurisdictions determines how strong 
the impact of the uncertainty is on the expected future income: the impact in case of perfectly 
negatively correlated weighting strategies is twice as high as that of uncorrelated strategies.  
I contribute to the existing literature on regulatory risk and tax risk through a theoretical framework 
that deals with the effects arising from tax uncertainty in interjurisdictional settings. I identify two 
rather surprising results. First, tax base uncertainty (here implied by the application of the individual 
system) does not necessarily dampen MJGs’ expectations about its future income and thus may not 
discourage investments. Second, more uncertainty may result in even higher expectations concerning 
future income.  
The results are helpful for policy makers debating the concrete design of a formulary apportionment 
system as well as for MJGs in jurisdictions where the implementation of an individual system is being 
considered. It is demonstrated that uncertainty implied by an individual system may not dampen 
MJGs’ expectations about future income and thus may not slow down the economy in jurisdictions. 
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Specifically, the results could be useful in a CCCTB context. If the Member States continue to fail to 
reach agreement on the implementation of a CCCTB, individually determined factor weights by each 
jurisdiction may re-enter the agenda.  
The results of this analysis may also be helpful in assessing the consequences from other sources of 
tax base uncertainty, especially within a CCCTB context. Some research analyzes the effects of legal 
loopholes or questions regarding the interpretation and implementation of the proposed CCCTB 
system. However, contrary to my study, these studies use specific elements of tax base uncertainty to 
motivate their research question but do not investigate tax uncertainty in particular. Eberhartinger and 
Petutschnig (2014) focus on the unclear definition of the term “employee” which is a factor of the 
apportionment formula under the proposed CCCTB system. Kiesewetter et al. (2014), in their analysis, 
consider room for discretion concerning the apportionment factor “assets”. Both studies address a 
specific form of factor uncertainty. In this context my results could, to some extent, also be helpful for 
discussing implications of other sources of factor uncertainty.  
When interpreting the results, one has to bear in mind the following two limitations. First, even if 
widely in line with empirical evidence (Weiner (1994), (1999), Lightner (1999)), behavioral 
adjustments by rational MJGs when faced with changing factor weights are excluded. The expected 
after-tax future value under the individual system would increase if behavioral adjustments were 
accounted for. Thus, the results are likely biased towards the disadvantage of the individual system. 
Second, I assume risk neutral decision-makers of MJGs. Assuming risk aversion would favor the 
common system, since the MJG decision-maker would demand an additional risk premium for 
applying the individual system.   
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Fig. 1: Possible combinations of weighting developments in jurisdiction 1 and 2 for the sales factor weight (two-period setting, uncorrelated factor weights 
Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 
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Notes: Since the developments of factor weights in both jurisdictions are perfectly negatively correlated, the factor weight development in jurisdiction 2 is a function of the factor 
weights in jurisdiction 1. The different types of lines indicate the development of factor weights in jurisdiction 2 given the development in jurisdiction 1. The developments in 
both jurisdictions must follow the same patterns of lines. E.g., if the factor weights in jurisdiction 1 are chosen in line with the dotted line, the corresponding weights in 
jurisdiction 2 are illustrated by a dotted line, too. If the factor weights in jurisdiction 1 are chosen according to the path described by the solid line (first branch) and the dashed 
line (second branch) then the resulting weights in jurisdiction 2 are correspondingly illustrated by the solid and dashed branches. 
 
Fig. 2: Possible combinations of weighting developments in jurisdiction 1 and 2 for the sales factor weight (two-period setting, perfectly negatively correlated factor weights) 
Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 
